How much would you lose if you got hacked tomorrow?Verified findings. Zero scanner noise.
We find the ways in, close them and show you the proof. The work is done by the Lops. People, not a bot that spits out alerts.
Multi-domain pentesting and continuous monitoring (CTEM) under signed authorization and a hash-pinned scope. A Lop verifies and signs every finding, with PoC, fix and retest.
We only look at what is public. Going further needs your signed authorization first.
Example: “anyone can send email as your CEO”Example: DMARC p=none · 1 dangling CNAME
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1
We find
What could go wrong, and what it would cost you in money.
Automated battery, a creative pass by a Lop and an adversarial false-positive review.
2
We fix
A Lop closes it, or your own team does. Your call.
Per-finding fix with a reproducible PoC. Lop Fix billed hourly or at a fixed price.
3
We prove it
Evidence for your insurer, your auditor or the big client asking for it.
Retest against the same pinned scope (sha256), with a signed trail.
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Start with what could happen to you. Each case covers the risk, the cost and how we close it.
Based on a real finding from one of our assessments, anonymized. A checklist review calls it safe; we found it anyway.
Severity: High · CWE-639
Other customers’ invoices could be downloaded, even though the system looked safe at first glance
IDOR in the PDF export: authorization lived in the view, not in the download
What could happen
The invoice screen did block anyone who was not the owner. But the PDF download link, handled by a different part of the system, served any customer’s file to whoever had the link.
What it costs
A data breach now costs US$4.99 million on average, a record according to IBM. The law also requires you to report it: in the European Union you have 72 hours to notify the regulator.Sources: IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2026 (global average); GDPR, Article 33.
What to do
Check who is asking for the file in every part of the system, not just the main screen. A Lop closed it and tested it again.
Evidence
GET /app/invoices/9f3c-e21 403 # view: checks owner
GET /files/invoices/9f3c-e21.pdf 200 OK # download: no check
→ ██████ · ████@████ · items: [...]
Impact
IDs are UUIDs (not enumerable) and the view checks the owner, so the direct test returns 403. But the UUID leaked in a public review, and /files/…pdf, served by a different controller, does not re-check ownership (CWE-639). Read access to any customer’s personal data.
Fix
Object-level authorization in every controller that touches the resource, the export included. A UUID is not an access control.
It smells what nobody sees, gets in where others can’t and knows every exit of the burrow. That is how the Lops work, our team: ten security specialists with certifications you can check (OSCP, OSWE, CISSP and more). Tools raise the signal. A Lop makes the call, and signs at the bottom of every report.
What I’d Lose is our cyberattack loss calculator. It estimates the cost of each scenario, from ransomware to invoice fraud, and every number shows its source.